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I.

U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY

In 1895, Cuban revolutionaries sought independence from Spanish control and fought
hard to achieve that goal.1 With this conflict came instability in Cuba, subsequently catching the
attention of the United States, given its proximity to the conflict.2 The United States officially
became intertwined in the issue when the U.S.S. Maine battleship exploded and then sank in a
Havana harbor in February of 1898.3 An investigation suggested that the ship sunk after coming
into contact with a mine placed in the water by Spain.4 By April of 1898, the United States
Congress formally waged war against Spain initiating the Spanish-American War of 1898.5
The War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in December of 1898.6 Under this
Treaty, Spain surrendered control of Cuba, marking the beginning of a close relationship
between the United States and Cuba, as well as a period in which the United States was
recognized as a superpower.7 With this recognition came enhanced responsibility. The United
States was no longer an isolationist power and committed itself to fostering democracy across the
globe.8
To do so, the United States promoted capitalism and specifically denounced socialist and
communist regimes. This became apparent during the Cold War after the Soviet Union became a
highly-competitive superpower.9 At first, the Cold War was a political fight with both the United
States and the Soviet Union pushing their political agendas throughout the world.10 As the
United States and the Soviet Union attempted to sway other countries in one direction over
another, the political fight became increasingly militaristic.11
Militarization of the Cold War culminated in 1949, when the Soviet Union displayed its
nuclear weapon capabilities.12 This meant that the United States was no longer the only country
with nuclear bombs.13 The fear that arose from the United States’ loss of this monopolistic power
was tremendous. In the years following, people in the United States lived in fear of a Communist
takeover.
In 1959, fear of a Communist takeover grew substantially when Fidel Castro rose to
power in Cuba and instituted a socialist state.14 Under the socialist state, Castro nationalized all
1

The Spanish American War, 1898, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/spanishamerican-war (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
The USS Maine Explodes in Havana Harbor, History, (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/the-maine-explodes.
5
Supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
1898: The Birth of a Superpower, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/shorthistory/superpower (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
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Id.
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Cold War History, History, (Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history.
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Id.
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Id.
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Cold War, Encyclopedia Britannica, (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War.
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Id.
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U.S.-Cuba Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cubarelations.
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foreign controlled assets in the country, including American-owned banks.15 In response,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated the Cuban embargo and cut the Cuban sugar import
quota.16 Despite these strategic moves by President Eisenhower, Castro remained in power.
President Eisenhower then planned an offensive attack. President Eisenhower left office before
initiating the attack, so he passed his plans – known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion – on to President
John F. Kennedy.17
The Bay of Pigs Invasion occurred on April 17, 1961, when President Kennedy sent a
group of Cuban exiles, backed and trained by the CIA, into Cuba to overthrow the regime.18 Not
only did the invasion fail, but it strengthened ties between Castro and the Soviet Union. President
Kennedy responded by issuing a complete trade embargo.19
In 1962, the Soviet Union identified Cuba as an advantageous location for nuclear
missiles due to the country’s proximity to the United States and began nuclear armament in
Cuba.20 Once the United States learned of the Soviet Union’s advancements in Cuba, fears in the
United States reached an all-time high.
This head-to-head, nuclear weapons faceoff marked the period known as the Cuban
Missile Crisis.21 During this period, both the United States and the Soviet Union feared each
other, but leaders of both nations knew that any use of nuclear weapons by either side would
result in mutually-assured destruction.22 In other words, both superpowers knew that any military
initiation would be met with an equally-destructive counter-attack, rendering the initial attack
obsolete. The Cuban Missile Crisis was an exceptionally fearful time in American history.
Nevertheless, President Kennedy was prepared to fight. “On October 26, Kennedy told his
advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted
on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.”23
Keeping the diplomatic channel open proved to be one of the best decisions made during
this period. Later that day, the Kremlin reached out to President Kennedy via John Scali, a news
correspondent for ABC News.24 Scali informed the White House that the Kremlin advised him
that they would pull out of Cuba so long as the United States did not initiate an attack.25 Shortly
thereafter, the Kremlin sent President Kennedy a message directly. “‘If there is no intention,’ he
said, ‘to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the
forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for
15

Timeline: U.S.-Cuba Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-cuba-relations (last
visited May. 4, 2020).
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David Greenberg, Beware the Military Industrial Complex, Slate, (Jan. 14, 2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110119121008/http://www.slate.com/id/2281124/pagenum/all/.
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24
Id.
25
Id.

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 16, Issue 1

37

this.’”26 One day later, a U.S. military plane was shot down over Cuba.27 At the same time, the
Kremlin sent another message making additional requests for the U.S., including the removal of
U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.28 Tensions between the two countries immediately rose again,
and any hope that the United States had in pursuing a peaceful resolution was lost.
Nonetheless, President Kennedy made one last effort to resolve the tension
diplomatically. He ignored the Kremlin’s second message but acknowledged the first one and
confirmed he was willing to comply with the Kremlin’s proposal to remove missiles from Cuba
so long as the U.S. refrains from attacking.29 Attorney General Robert Kennedy, acting on his
own, met with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States.30 Robert Kennedy told the
Ambassador that the U.S. was planning on removing its missiles from Turkey regardless of the
Kremlin’s request, but that this removal could not be part of the public’s understanding of the
resolution between the Kremlin and President Kennedy.31
On October 28, the Kremlin announced its intention to remove its missiles from Cuba.32
The Cuban Missile crisis was officially over. Although the Cuban Missile Crisis was diverted,
the United States remained fearful of Cuba. Cuba was still operating as a socialist state, so
President Kennedy’s full embargo seeking to isolate Cuba was still in force.33
The full embargo was composed of two major features: travel restrictions and economic
sanctions. The travel restrictions virtually banned all travel between the United States and
Cuba.34 Likewise, the economic sanctions restricted all trade between the United States and
Cuba.35

II.

POST-CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS RELATIONS

In September 1965, Castro announced to his people that they no longer had to sneak out
of Cuba to go to the United States.36 President Lyndon B. Johnson responded by welcoming
Cubans to the United States and giving immigration preference to those with family ties in the
United States.37 Cubans were also permitted to pursue permanent residency one year after
reaching the United States.38
Diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba continued to grow in the years
following the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter and Castro agreed to a
26
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limited diplomatic exchange.39 Under this exchange, both countries would send a small group of
diplomats, called “interest sections” to each other’s countries.40 The United States’ interest
section in Cuba would operate within the Swiss Embassy and Cuba’s interest section in the
United States would operate within the Czech Embassy.41 The goal was to open dialogue
between the two countries directly. Opening reciprocal embassies was not yet an option because
neither the U.S. nor Cuba were ready to call each other allies.42
In 1982, however, hostility reappeared after President Ronald Reagan labeled Castro and
his government a “terrorism sponsor” in response to Castro’s support to several communist
groups in African and Latin American countries.43 A few years later, in 1985, Castro halted
emigration of Cubans to the United States as well as the repatriation of Cubans living in the
United States.44
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 signaled to the United States an opportunity to
promote democracy in Cuba. In 1992, the United States enacted the Cuban Democracy Act under
President George H.W. Bush to tighten and strengthen sanctions against Cuba.45 In 1996, under
President Bill Clinton, the United States enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Act,
otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act, after two American civilian planes were shot down
by the Cuban military.46 The Act codified the embargo regulations.47 Additionally, the Act
allowed only for the removal of sanctions under a limited set of circumstances: (1) neither Castro
nor his brother, Raul Castro, could be in office; and (2) Cuba needed to make steps towards
democracy.48
Another major shift in attitude towards Cuba began in 2008, when Castro officially
stepped down as president and gave the position to Raul Castro due to his declining health.49 In
2009, President Obama began to loosen restrictions with Cuba by allowing Cuban-Americans to
send money to Cuba and by allowing Americans to visit Cuba, although only for very limited
religious and educational purposes.50
With the help of Pope Francis, President Barack Obama and Raul Castro held secret
discussions; and after 18 months, the two leaders decided to restore diplomatic ties between the
United States and Cuba.51 With this commitment to restore diplomatic ties came the continued
loosening of sanctions and restrictions, known as the Cuban Thaw.52 Under this thaw came three
39
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major developments. First, President Obama eliminated Cuba’s designation as a “terrorist
sponsor.”53 Second, President Obama and Raul Castro reinstated diplomatic relations and
reopened embassies.54 Third, the United States rolled back the embargo regulations in an effort
to promote an increase in trade and travel between the two countries.55 However, President
Obama could not actually lift the embargo without a change in legislation since the embargo was
codified under the Helms-Burton Act.56
During the Obama presidency, the United States and Cuba both supported the steps being
taken to restore relations. As Cuba continued to liberalize its economic and political processes,
the United States continued to loosen its restrictions.57 Symbolic of this progress was President
Obama’s trip to Cuba in 2016.58 The last sitting president to visit Cuba was President Coolidge
in 1928.59 Another major symbol of the progress was the creation of commercial airline services
between the two countries, which had been non-existent for the prior 50 years.60
President Obama’s final move before leaving office was the elimination of the “wet foot,
dry foot” policy implemented in 1995.61 Under this policy, unauthorized Cubans arriving in the
United States could pursue permanent residency, thus distinguishing Cuban migrants from other
migrants.62 While repealing this policy initially appears to hurt Cuban migrants, the repeal
supports the broader goal of normalizing relations with Cuba.63 In the past, Cuba was unwilling
to accept Cubans removed from the United States.64 Now, Cuba is willing to accept deported
Cubans, allowing the United States to maintain a more uniform immigration policy towards
Cuba and other nations.
When President Donald Trump took office, the Obama era thaw came to an end. While
President Trump vowed to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba, he tightened many of the
restrictions loosened under President Obama.65 President Trump feared the Cuban government
was reaping the benefits of the loosened restrictions rather than the people.66 He declared that the
sanctions would not be lifted until Cuba implemented specific democratic practices, such as
freedom of expression and free and fair elections.67
More recently, the Cuban National Assembly elected Miguel Diaz-Canel as President
after Raul Castro chose not to run in the election.68 The election of Miguel Diaz-Canel marked

53
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the first time in the last 60 years that Cuba has not been under the rule of a Castro.69
Nevertheless, the United States, under President Trump, is bolstering its hardline approach with
Cuba, especially following the mysterious injuries suffered by American diplomats at the
Embassy in Havana.70 It remains unknown whether or not President Trump will reintroduce
Cuba’s designation as a “terrorism sponsor.”71

III.

U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS’ IMPACT ON AMERICA’S PASTIME

While U.S.-Cuba relations have gone through a lot over the last 100 years, younger
generations are familiar with Cuba as a communist country with whom the United States has had
conflict with, but do not live in the same fear of prior generations. In other words, the younger
generations are spared the fear that existed during the Cold War. However, one major area of
American life that continues to suffer from prior, contentious U.S.-Cuba relations is America’s
pastime—baseball.
Cuba is known for producing some of the best baseball players in MLB history.72 Luis
Tiant, “El Tiante,” known for his exotic pitching windup, helped the Boston Red Sox win the
World Series in 1975.73 For MLB, he was a star player. For Cuba, he was a defector who left
shortly after the Bay of Pigs Invasion.74 As a result, he was not allowed to return home and went
14 years without seeing his family.75
Other famous MLB players from Cuba include Tony Perez, Jose Conseco, Minnie
Minoso, and Leo Cardenas.76 Current MLB players from Cuba include Aroldis Chapman, Yoenis
Céspedes, and Yasiel Puig.77 MLB fans know these individuals because of their extraordinary
skill. What most don’t know, however, is the path they endured to make it into MLB.
In April 2012, Yasiel Puig made one of the biggest decisions of his life at the age of 21.78
He could either remain in Cuba and continue his baseball career there, or he could escape with
the goal of playing for an MLB team.79 After 30 hours of hiking without sleep to a deserted
Cuban beach, Puig and three others were extracted from the Bay of Pigs in a cigarette boat by
lancheros – boatmen in the business of smuggling people out of Cuba.80 Puig, a well-known
baseball player throughout Cuba, Yunior Despaigne, a well-known boxer in Cuba who was
travelling with Puig, and the two others with them finally thought they were free as the boat sped
69

Id.
Supra note 14.
71
Id.
72
Will Leitch, 12 Best Cuban-born players in MLB history, MLB News, (Mar. 11, 2019),
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away.81 Little did they know, however, the lancheros were affiliated with Los Zetas, a Mexican
cartel, and listed on several law enforcements’ most wanted lists.82
After 36 hours, they arrived at a little island off the coast of Cancún in Mexico.83 Puig
and his three companions were brought to a boarding house full of other Cuban defectors by the
lancheros.84 The lead lanchero, known as Tomasito, was a Cuban-born criminal operating his
business from Cancún, Mexico. 85 He wound up in Mexico after posting bail in Florida and
fleeing to avoid charges of grand larceny and aggravated assault of a police officer with a
weapon.86
Tomasito’s business was typically procured by relatives in the United States willing to
pay to have their remaining relatives in Cuba brought to the United States.87 Tomasito charged,
on average, $10,000 per regular Cuban civilian.88 When families could not pay, Tomasito and his
lancheros would keep the smuggled Cubans until money was produced.89
For someone like Puig, who is not your traditional, regular Cuban civilian, the price to
smuggle is much more. Raul Pacheco, a Miami-resident born in Cuba, instructed Yunior
Despaigne to convince Yasiel Puig to defect and hired the lancheros to facilitate.90 Pacheco was
thus responsible for making the payment to Tomasito. According to Despaigne, Pacheco was
aware of Puig’s MLB potential and saw bringing Puig to the United States as a business
opportunity.91 According to Pacheco, bringing Puig to the U.S. was Despaigne’s idea and
Pacheco’s involvement was just to provide the financial support needed to get Puig across the
border.92 Either way, it was clear that Pacheco was responsible for making the payment to
Tomasito.93 Until Pacheco paid $250,000, Puig was not going to be allowed to leave the
boarding house.94 After speaking with Pacheco, Puig learned that he did not yet have the funds
but was working on gathering enough to get them out.95
Puig, Despaigne, and the two others were guarded in the boarding house.96 Escaping
control from the lancheros was not an option because neither Puig nor his companions had
Mexican pesos and getting apprehended by Mexican authorities would likely result in their
deportation back to Cuba and subsequent imprisonment.97 After time passed with no payment
from Pacheco, Tomasito raised the release price to $400,000.98 In the meantime, another human81
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trafficking ring got wind of Puig’s potential to sign a multimillion dollar contract to play baseball
in the U.S.99 This ring, which had connections to Tomasito and the operations in Cancún, began
scrambling for money with the hopes of acquiring Puig.100 Pacheco was then approached by this
ring to partner up in finding a way to release Puig from Tomasito’s grip.101 Pacheco bought some
time with Tomasito while the ring reached out to El Comando de Cancún, a man with
connections in the Cancún Police Department.102
Pacheco then spoke with Puig and the others and advised them to be ready to escape in
the middle of the night.103 That night, two men came to the boarding house and successfully
snuck Puig and his companions out of Tomasito’s captivity.104 After a likely bribe from El
Comando, Puig and his companions flew to Mexico City without any passports.105
Before Puig could sign with an MLB team, Puig had to establish residency outside of
Cuba before the U.S. Department of the Treasury would permit an MLB team to sign a Cuban
national.106 What is typically a lengthy process surprisingly only lasted about 15 days for Puig
and cost $20,000 in additional bribes.107 Puig then signed with the Los Angeles Dodgers for $42
million.108 Signing with the Los Angeles dodgers was not the end of his story.109 Puig had one
more obstacle. He had to physically enter the United States. Without a passport and in an effort
to cover the tracks of the smugglers, Puig was advised to present himself at the border as a
Cuban national and seek asylum under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.110 Puig was then
paroled into the United States and no one thought twice about how he got there.111
Although Puig’s story is unique, many other athletes have been smuggled out of Cuba.
The underground market for smuggling baseball players out of Cuba is known as the “bolsa
negra,” which translates to the black bag, and represents the black-market operation.112 The
existence of this underground network is what prompted MLB and FCB to negotiate an
agreement.

IV.

MLB-CUBA AGREEMENT

To combat the “bolsa negra,” MLB and FCB reached an agreement in December 2018.113
According to MLB, the goal of the agreement was to end the need for Cuban players to defect
99
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and to prevent the human trafficking involved in the process.114 Talks of this agreement were
made possible after President Obama initiated the Cuban Thaw. After three years of negotiation,
due to FCB’s reluctance to release players to MLB, the agreement came to fruition.115
Under the agreement, Cuba would allow players over the age of 25 and who have played
in Cuba for at least 6 years to sign with teams in MLB.116 For players under 25, FCB held
discretion in releasing these players.117 In exchange for allowing players to sign with an MLB
team, FCB would receive a transfer fee.118 The agreed transfer fee would be between 15% and
20% of the player’s contract.119

V.

TERMINATING THE AGREEMENT

Approximately four months after the agreement was reached, when the first set of players
were ready to be released, President Trump eliminated the agreement.120 The Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”), which operates under the U.S. Department of the Treasury, sent a
letter to MLB insisting that they halt all activity under the agreement.121 In the letter, Acting
Assistant Director for Licensing with OFAC, Nikole Thomas, advised MLB that the previouslyissued general license was no longer authorized.122 According to OFAC, any payment to FCB
would be a payment to the Cuban government and therefore illegal under the embargo.123
Needless to say, the MLB community was shocked. Cuban athletes and MLB alike were
deeply disappointed.124 Aroldis Chapman, a pitcher for the New York Yankees, stated through a
translator, “‘I just feel bad for those young ballplayers who are probably not going to have the
same chance to play here. It's definitely difficult for a lot of Cuban players who are not playing at
this level here in the States. But the way we got here, it was tough -- to say the least.’”125
According to President Trump and other opponents, the agreement would have subjected
Cuban players to human trafficking by the Cuban government and would have permitted the
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Cuban government to take advantage of the players.126 The Trump administration holds the
agreement invalid on the grounds that the Obama administration incorrectly concluded that FCB
operates apart from the Cuban government.127
Acting under the Trump administration, the U.S. Department of the Treasury agreed that
FCB is indeed a government actor.128 More specifically, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
holds that FCB belongs to the National Sports Institute and therefore is a government entity.129
Therefore, any business with FCB – such as the agreement between MLB and FCB – equates to
doing business with Cuba and thus is illegal under the rules of the Cuban embargo.130 Despite
Cuba’s declaration that FCB is not a government entity, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
determination stands in the way of the historic agreement.131

VI.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

The U.S. Department of the Treasury was created in 1789 by Congress, operates under
the executive branch, and is charged with handling the United States’ financial matters. 132
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s website, its mission is to, “…maintain a
strong economy and create economic and employment opportunities by promoting the conditions
that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen national security by
combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system, and manage the U.S.
Government’s finances and resources effectively.”133 While the focus is largely domestic, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s involvement in foreign affairs is substantial, given that
foreign affairs can have a significant impact on the United States’ economy and national
security. One of the most prominent devices for combatting threats to the economy and national
security is through the implementation of economic sanctions.134
These economic sanctions are implemented through OFAC – a division of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury. Economic sanction is the blanket term for an assortment of
strategies used to combat economic and security concerns spawning from foreign countries.
These sanctions include, but are not limited to, freezing assets, prohibiting payments, and
prohibiting services to countries, countries’ governments, and individuals within countries.135
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Because OFAC operates under the U.S. Department of the Treasury, an executive
department, OFAC derives most of its power to issue sanctions from the President’s national
emergency powers and relevant legislation.136 In 1917, during World War I, Congress passed the
Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”).137 The purpose of this Act was to grant the President
power to control trade between the United States and its enemies during war.138 In the 1930s,
Congress increased the President’s power by extending this control beyond wartime to include
times of peace, so long as a national emergency was declared.139
In 1976 and 1977, the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”) and subsequent International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) were passed, respectively, to limit the President’s
powers.140 NEA terminated all current national emergency declarations and added more structure
to and review of a President’s declaration of a national emergency.141 Within NEA is the IEEPA,
which added more restrictions to the President’s power. The IEEPA requires that a President
consult with Congress before declaring a national emergency and provide Congress with reports
every six months following the declaration.142 The report is intended to explain the
circumstances and why those circumstances warrant a national security response.143 Failure to
present a report results in automatic discontinuation of the national emergency declaration and
the President’s powers under that designation.144
Although the NEA and IEEPA were designed to restrict the President’s power, actual
limitations on Presidential power has been minimal. Less than ten years after its enactment, the
NEA took a major hit in the groundbreaking, immigration case, INS v. Chadha in 1985.145 Prior
to Chadha, a national emergency declaration could be terminated by a concurrent resolution in
Congress.146 A concurrent resolution only requires passage by the Senate and House of
Representatives.147 Following Chadha, which held that legislative vetoes violate the separation
of powers and are unconstitutional, the NEA was amended to require a joint resolution – which
requires a President’s signature – in order to terminate a national emergency declaration.148
Experts in the field contend that the NEA and IEEPA are formalities, leaving the
President otherwise unrestricted in declaring a national emergency and reaping the subsequent
associated powers derived under TWEA.149 Presidents have continuously derived authority from
136
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TWEA to issue sanctions against countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and, unsurprisingly,
Cuba.150
In addition to TWEA, and specifically regarding its policy toward Cuba, the executive
branch derives authority from an array of legislation. In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign
Assistance Act (“FAA”).151 The FAA prohibits the United States from offering assistance to any
communist country.152 President Kennedy referenced the FAA when he directed the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit imports and exports, respectively, with
Cuba.153
Two years later, in 1963, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”) were issued
under TWEA, which further authorized sanctions with Cuba.154 “The sanctions froze all Cuban
assets in the USA and mandated the U.S. Treasury Department to regulate all commercial
transactions with Cuba, including authorized travel to Cuba by U.S. nationals.”155 These
sanctions also had a major impact on travel between the two countries by restricting all
commercial transactions, including those related to travel such as hotel and airline bookings.156
Even after the end of the Cold War, additional legislation has been passed to support the
Executive’s authority to impose economic restrictions against Cuba. In 1992, the Cuban
Democracy Act (“CDA”) was enacted under President George H.W. Bush.157 The CDA, also
known as the Torricelli Act, bolsters the United States’ strategy with Cuba by imposing
sanctions on any country that provides assistance to Cuba.158 However, the CDA includes an
exception for humanitarian assistance.159 The CDA also prevents U.S. nationals from sending
remittances to Cuba while also prohibiting any subsidiaries of U.S. companies from engaging in
transactions with Cuba.160
In 1996, under President Clinton, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
(Libertad), also known as the Helms-Burton Act, was passed.161 “This act further wrote into law
the sanctions against Cuba. In particular, it sought to ‘strengthen international sanctions against
the Castro government’, and to ‘plan for support of a transition government leading to a
democratically elected government in Cuba.”162 The overall goal of the Act was to push Cuba to
consider a democratic government, and it did so by reinforcing the United States’ sanctions
against Cuba.
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In sum, there is no shortage of authority keeping the executive branch, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, and OFAC from remaining stern with Cuba.

VII.

OFAC AND MLB

As the Obama administration began to rollback sanctions against Cuba, opportunities
between Cubans and Americans became available. MLB and FCB seized this opportunity and
developed the aforementioned agreement. FCB players no longer had to defect from Cuba, and
in exchange for their approval to leave FCB and play for MLB, FCB was paid a transfer fee from
MLB.
What made this agreement legal was the general license made available under the Obama
administration in 2016.163 Licenses are issued by OFAC and grant permission to an individual or
entity to engage in business with another individual or entity that may otherwise be illegal under
imposed sanctions.164 However, as previously stated, permissions were quickly eliminated under
the Trump administration. Out of fear that FCB was an entity of the Cuban government, and in
line with the administration’s hardline approach on Cuba, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
withdrew MLB’s license.165
Without a license, MLB can no longer legally engage with FCB. This put the agreement
on hold and placed the players back in limbo. Because FCB already had a list of players ready to
be released, MLB tried to keep the agreement alive. According to the New York Times, MLB
“…was prepared to base its argument on the fact that the Obama administration had given it a
license in 2016 to do business with the Cuban baseball federation, and that a Trump-era national
security presidential memorandum published on June 16, 2017 promised the agreement would be
grandfathered in.”166 Nevertheless, the Trump administration has continued to withhold
permission previously granted under the license.

VIII. LEGAL REMEDIES
Depending on a President’s approach to U.S.-Cuba Relations, American citizens’ and
entities’ freedom to engage with Cuba greatly varies. What does not change, however, is the
embargo. Because the embargo has been written into law through a series of the aforementioned
legislation, lifting the embargo requires the will of Congress; the President cannot do so alone.
Therefore, the first and most aggressive avenue MLB can take in moving forward with their
agreement would involve lifting the embargo. This entails convincing the American people, or
more realistically their respective representation in Congress, that the embargo should be lifted.
To convince Congress, MLB would have to exert serious lobbying efforts, likely with an
emphasis on the humanitarian concerns of players like Yasiel Puig. Although baseball is
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America’s pastime, it would still be hard, if not impossible, for MLB to convince Congress to lift
the embargo. Promoting America’s pastime is an effort many can support, but by itself, it is not
enough to justify lifting the embargo that summarizes years of history with Cuba.
With no end in sight for the embargo, MLB is stuck navigating through the executive
branch if it wishes to continue to act upon its agreement with FCB. A remedy within this branch
of government would be a license, which again permits a party to engage in a transaction with a
Cuban entity that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions.167 This is what MLB previously
held. However, the revocation of their general license does not prevent MLB from applying for a
specific license.
Because OFAC determined that the proposed transactions between MLB and FCB were
not authorized under § 515.571(e) of the CACR, and revoked the general license, MLB’s next
move would be to apply for a specific license.168 “A general license authorizes ‘a particular type
of transaction for a class of persons without the need to apply for a license.’ A specific license ‘is
a written document issued by OFAC to a particular person or entity, authorizing a particular
transaction in response to a written license application.’”169
In order to obtain a specific license, MLB must convince OFAC that FCB is not an entity
of the Cuban government and that money paid by MLB to FCB would not benefit the communist
regime. Moreover, an application for a license does not take the shape of a typical application; it
is not merely a form to be completed.170 Rather, the bulk of the application consists of the
applicant’s written argument in favor of granting the license and all relevant information
regarding the transactions that would take place under the license.171 To help assemble the
application, applicants are advised to turn to the Code of Federal Regulations.172 However, the
regulations essentially just encourage applicants to be thorough with their proposed transactions
and transparent with the parties involved.173
The application is then sent to OFAC for consideration. “OFAC provides scant public
information about the approval process for licenses. OFAC broadly states that its licensing
determinations are ‘guided by U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns’ and may
involve coordination with other federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of State and the
U.S. Department of Commerce.”174 In short, there is no list enumerating which factors OFAC
weighs heavily, which factors OFAC weighs lightly, or which factors OFAC even takes into
consideration.
In the application for MLB, it is important to stress the humanitarian concerns. Taxing
accounts of players like Yasiel Puig demonstrate the harm young athletes endure to pursue their
dreams of playing professional sports in the United States. This is precisely the type of problem
that the license seeks to prevent. Additionally, MLB’s application must alleviate concerns that
167
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FCB is an entity of the Cuban government. After all, the sanctions are intentionally imposed to
the detriment of the Cuban government.
Despite the strong arguments that could be made in favor of granting the license, OFAC
is likely to issue a denial, especially in the wake of revoking MLB’s prior license issued under
the Obama administration.
Once denied, options moving forward are limited. According to the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, “[a] denial by OFAC of a license application constitutes final agency action. The
regulations do not provide for a formal process of appeal. However, OFAC will reconsider its
determinations for good cause, for example, where the applicant can demonstrate changed
circumstances or submit additional relevant information...”175 In this case, it is presumed that
MLB has already laid everything out in their application for the license. Unless new information
comes to light, there are likely no available avenues for reopening the application based on good
cause, changed circumstances, or having additional relevant information not already provided.
Thus, MLB is left with one more branch of government – the Judiciary.
MLB’s final option is to obtain a review of OFAC’s decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). The APA was created in 1946 and was designed as a safeguard against
agencies acquiring too much power.176 “An agency was defined as any authority of the United
States excluding Congress, the courts, and the governments of territories, possessions, or the
District of Columbia.” 177 Agencies, like the U.S. Department of the Treasury, operate under the
executive branch and often reflect the will of the President. Moreover, these agencies and their
decisions often operate outside of the normal system of checks and balances, thus granting
additional powers to the President.
While many argue this is unconstitutional, there are many practical benefits to allowing
agencies to handle matters without the legislative and judicial branches. As an example, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture determines the guidelines and regulations for businesses selling
animal products for human consumption. The agency is entrusted with the task of setting such
safety standards, as the agency is staffed with highly qualified experts in the field. By allowing
the agency to handle matters in this area, the U.S. government does not have to exhaust resources
that could be used elsewhere. Agencies promote efficiency and expertise with highly-technical
matters in areas that the government, in broad terms, does not have the time or energy to manage.
Nevertheless, agencies should not be free to operate unrestrained just because they are
experts in their respective fields. After the creation of the APA, agencies no longer have free
reign to do whatever they choose. “The purposes of the act were: (1) to ensure that agencies keep
the public informed of their organization, procedures, and rules, (2) to provide for public
participation in the rule-making process, (3) to prescribe uniform standards for. . . adjudicatory
proceedings, and (4) to restate the law of judicial review.”178
Most relevant to MLB’s dilemma is the APA’s power to review final agency decisions,
such as OFAC’s final agency decision not to issue the license. When judicial review of agency
175
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action is afforded, courts most frequently apply the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.179 Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Auto Mutual Insurance Company offers an
explanation for this standard of review:
In State Farm, the Court explained that in applying this ‘narrow’ standard of
review,180 ‘a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’ Rather,
a court should only invalidate agency determinations that fail to ‘examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for [the] action including a
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”’ When
reviewing that determination, courts must ‘consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.’181
Therefore, all that matters is whether the agency considered all of the relevant facts and
made a logical decision based on those facts. Where this is the case, it is highly likely that the
agency’s decision will stand.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury revoked MLB’s license in a letter to MLB’s
attorneys. The letter stated that the agency decided to revoke the license after new facts were
brought to the agency’s attention.182 The agency did not disclose the facts in question but cited to
§ 515.571(e) of the CACR.183 Under this section, hiring Cuban nationals to work in the United
States in a non-immigrant status may be permitted so long as no payments are made to the Cuban
government in relation to the hiring of the Cuban national.184 Therefore, a Cuban baseball player
may be hired and permitted to play with MLB so long as no payments in relation to their
employment are paid to the Cuban government. Where the agreement runs counter to §
515.571(e) of the CACR, according to the letter, is in the proposed payments to FCB.185 As
previously mentioned, OFAC concluded that FCB is an entity of the Cuban Government. This
means that payments paid to FCB are payments made to the Cuban Government and thus
prohibited under § 515.571(e) of the CACR.186
This determination by OFAC is where MLB may plausibly make an “arbitrary and
capricious” argument. For MLB, this entails presenting evidence that OFAC arbitrarily
concluded that FCB is an entity of the Cuban Government. To make a showing that the Trump
administration arbitrarily revoked the license, MLB should turn to the 2020 Caribbean Series.
Every winter, a handful of teams throughout Latin America compete in the Caribbean World
Series after their national seasons end. Participating teams typically come from Mexico, Puerto
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Rico, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Cuba.187 The tournament’s location
changes year-to-year depending on which Latin American country is hosting.188 In 2020, the
tournament was held in San Juan, Puerto Rico.189
For the first time in several years, Cuba did not participate.190 Approximately one month
before the tournament, the Caribbean Professional Baseball Confederation, the organization that
facilitates the event, announced that Cuba would not be participating in the tournament.191
Because the tournament was hosted in Puerto Rico – a U.S. territory – foreign nationals were
required to obtain visas. Accordingly, the Confederation excluded the Cuban players because of
issues with obtaining visas.192 Specifically, the Cuban players were not able to procure visas in
time for the tournament due to a late end date of their regular season in Cuba, so the
Confederation replaced them with another team.193 FCB, on the other hand, contends that the
exclusion of Cuban players in the tournament was the result of pressure from the U.S.
government on the Confederation.194
It is not clear whether the Cuban players did not have enough time to apply for visas or
whether the U.S. government put pressure on the Confederation to exclude the Cuban team. One
thing that is certain, however, is that if FCB were an entity of the Cuban government, the Cuban
embargo would outright prevent Cuban nationals from playing in Puerto Rico just like the Cuban
embargo prevents Cuban nationals from playing in MLB. This would have made the purported
visa issues and alleged government pressure moot.
The Trump administration terminated the agreement between MLB and FCB on the
grounds that FCB was an entity of the Cuban government. No such grounds were cited when the
FCB was planning on sending players to participate in a tournament in Puerto Rico. This lapse in
consistency supports the argument that the Trump administration arbitrarily concluded that FCB
is an entity of the Cuban government.
Unfortunately, the name of the entity – the Cuban Baseball Federation – by itself
suggests that it may be an entity of the Cuban government. Moreover, neither the Obama
administration nor MLB have set forth an explanation showing how they concluded that FCB
was not an entity of the Cuban government. Instead, the Obama administration and MLB
emphasize human trafficking concerns for pursuing the agreement between the two baseball
organizations.
Furthermore, the judicial review is not meant to reevaluate the facts and make a decision
whether or not to issue a license. Rather, the judicial review simply reevaluates the agency’s
decision-making process. Here, it would be hard for any court to conclude that the agency
arbitrarily or capriciously denied MLB a license based on its belief that FCB is an entity of the
187
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Cuban government. Under the narrow standard of review, the court will give substantial
deference to the agency. MLB faces an uphill battle. While legal remedies exist, they are
unlikely to yield fruitful results. Nevertheless, the future for MLB is not necessarily so bleak.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Cuban baseball players share a similar dilemma with Venezuelan baseball players. Like
Cuba, Venezuela is under a socialist regime and as of August 2019, is under strong economic
sanctions.195 This undeniably affects young Venezuelan baseball players and their potential to
play in Major League Baseball. Like the talent in Cuba, “…players from Venezuela are
vulnerable to such dangers due to their high profile and the lucrative contracts they sign.”196
Therefore, agreements like the one between MLB and FCB are more important than ever to
protect these young athletes and can serve as a model to help protect players in other countries.
Likewise, these agreements can be used as bargaining chips as part of a larger effort to
promote foreign relations. Although President Trump remains stern with his sanctions against
Cuba, he is aware that the MLB-FCB agreement is highly desirable for both parties. President
Trump also attributes Venezuela’s turmoil to Cuba’s involvement.197 In turn, President Trump
offered to review his revocation of the MLB-FCB agreement if MLB applies pressure to Cuba to
back away from Venezuela.198 However, President Trump made it clear that changes in Cuba
must occur before he makes any reconsiderations regarding the agreement:
‘The president taking a meeting with the commissioner of MLB to discuss a topic
that the administration recently made a ruling shows that the president is open to
seriously considering changing the administration ruling that was recently made,’
said Fernando Cutz, a former acting senior director for Western Hemisphere
affairs at the National Security Council in the Trump administration. ‘That shows
the president is willing to at least consider overruling whoever made that ultimate
decision underneath him.’199
In sum, the fate of the agreement predominantly rests on the President and the subsequent
reflection of the President’s will in executive agencies. With new administrations come new
goals and new means to achieve those goals. The next administration’s strategy with Cuba will
largely impact the future of MLB’s relationship with Cuba and FCB. Just as quickly as the
Trump administration moved to undue the Cuban Thaw from the Obama administration, the next
President may take a more open stance with Cuba. If the next president follows a similar
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trajectory with Cuba as President Obama, there is hope for MLB and FCB to eliminate the bolsa
negra.

